Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of State Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996 by McClatchey, Devereaux F.
CHERNOBYL AND SANDoz ONE DECADE LATER: THE EVOLUTION OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL DISASTERS, 1986-1996
Devereaux F. McClatchey*
Traditionally, international law has imposed few, if any, obligations upon
states in the wake of non-natural environmental disasters.1 In two of the
worst environmental catastrophes of all time, the Chernobyl explosion' in
the former Soviet Union and the Sandoz spill3 in Switzerland, neither of the
offending states were held liable for failing to protect, assist, or otherwise
notify any of their neighboring states. Both of these incidents took place in
1986, and both produced devastating consequences in the international
community. As a result, the past decade has witnessed a concerted effort
among international declarations,4 scholars in international law,5 and states
as reflected in international treaties6 to impose more duties upon states to
assist and notify other states in the event of environmental catastrophes.
* J.D. 1996. The author wishes to thank Porter Elliott for all his support, and all his
patience, with this project.
'See ALEXANDRE Kiss & DIANE SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69
(1991); Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1492, 1493 (1991) [hereinafter Developments].
2 See Ellen Moynagh, The Legacy of Chernobyl: Its Significance for the Ukraine and the
World, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 709 (1994); Jillian Barron, After Chernobyl: Liability
for Nuclear Accidents Under International Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L 647 (1987).
3 See Aaron Schwabach, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International Law to Protect
the Rhine from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (1989).
4 See, e.g., Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. at 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
S See generally David Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
Two Steps Forward and One Back, Or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599 (1995); Xue
Hanquin, Relativity in International Water Law, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 45
(1992).
6 See, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on Assistance in the Case
of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, opened for signature Sept. 26, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 1377 (1986) [hereinafter Assistance Convention]; IAEA Convention on Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident, opened for signature Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370
(1986) [hereinafter Notification Convention].
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But how far do these duties extend, and do they reflect binding customary
international law? Ten years after the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters
rocked the European continent, the threat of chemical and biological
transboundary harm looms larger today than ever before.7 Nuclear reactors
built thirty and forty years ago continue to deteriorate with age, while
depressed economies around the world provide scant funding for the swelling
costs of maintenance and repair. Third-world countries move with
unchecked haste toward more industrialized modes of commerce and
business, while international watercourses are forced to absorb increasing and
sometimes deadly levels of chemical waste and pollution! With the
potential for large-scale environmental catastrophes at an all-time high, does
international law now prescribe a set of obligations for states in which the
transboundary harm originates? Has international law progressed to a point
where offending states can expect to be held accountable?
Using the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters of 1986 as a starting point, this
article will track the development of international law on state responsibility
for international disasters. Part I will detail the factual backgrounds which
surrounded the Chernobyl explosion and the Sandoz spill and will highlight
the legal issues which arose in the wake of the disasters. Part II will discuss
the current sources of international law which address the issue of state
responsibility for international disasters, most notably 1) the International
Law Commission's Draft Articles and 2) the Rio Declaration. Part III will
analyze how the law as it exists today would have applied to the Chernobyl
and Sandoz situations of ten years ago, and it will discuss what legal issues
from the 1986 disasters still remain unresolved today in spite of the
developments in international law. Finally, Part IV will conclude with the
proposal that in order to more effectively resolve the problems which arise
when an international disaster occurs, a greater emphasis on political
cooperation and diplomacy should be pursued at the expense of the
prescription of ineffective, abstract "legal" obligations.
7 See, e.g., Terry Hall, "Carried by the Wind Out to Sea": Ireland and the Isle of Man
v. Sellafield: Anatomy of a Transboundary Pollution Dispute, 6 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L Rev. 639,
640 (1994).
8 For example, deadly cyanide spilled into the Essequibo River in Guyana on August 19,
1995, causing extensive danger to the water supply and industry of Guyana. Francois




PART I: CHERNOBYL AND SANDOZ: A FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Chernobyl
On April 26, 1986, a reactor exploded at a nuclear power plant located in
Chernobyl, U.S.S.R. 9 As a result of the explosion, a devastating amount of
radioactive emissions were released into the atmosphere, spreading quickly
throughout the Soviet Republic and eventually across the entire face of
Europe. ° While no one will ever know exactly how many people died as
a result of the explosion at Chernobyl, the official number of thirty-one listed
by Soviet authorities is almost certainly a gross misrepresentation."
Estimates as to the number of long-term cancer deaths that resulted from the
nuclear accident range from 14,000 to 475,000 worldwide.12 Scientists
estimate that up to 600,000 people outside of the Soviet Union have been
adversely affected by the nuclear fallout. 3
Despite the tremendous impact of the explosion, the government of the
Soviet Union failed to make a public statement regarding the explosion until
fifteen days after the explosion took place.' 4 By that time, all of Europe
had been affected; even Wales was forced to halt its dairy production as a
result of the nuclear fallout.' 5 A ban on the sale of leafy vegetables in Italy
was expected to impose losses of up to $100 million on Italian farmers.' 6
Reindeer in Sweden that had eaten lichen contaminated with radioactive
fallout were declared unfit for human consumption, and the subsequent loss
of 100,000 reindeer threatened the continued survival of the country's Lapp
population. 7 By June of 1987, "the West German government had paid
9 Barron, supra note 2, at 647.
10 Id. at 648. A study conducted by the U.S. Energy Department's Office of Health and
Environmental Research found that Chemobyl's emitted radiation equaled between one-tenth
and one-sixth of the total amount of radiation ever released by nuclear explosions after 1945.
Id. at 647, n. 1.
" Moynagh, supra note 2, at 739.
12 Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the
Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law, 21 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
215, 225 (1993).
3 Moynagh, supra note 2, at 720.
'4 Melanie L. Oxhorn, The Norms of Nuclear Accidents After Chernobyl, 8 J. NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENVTL. L. 375, 377 (1992-1993).
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291 million West German marks for injuries to German nationals resulting
from the Chernobyl incident."'"
Scholars have speculated why no countries brought claims against the
Soviet Union. Several countries indicated that they did not initiate any
proceedings against the Soviet Union because they did not believe there was
any legal basis for securing damages from the Soviet Government. 9 Other
factors might have also contributed to the reluctance of states to bring
claims, such as the difficulty in quantifying the damages, the problem of
identifying a direct causal link between the fallout and the harm, and the
potential for negative political implications.'
B. Sandoz
In the same year as the Chernobyl incident, the "Sandoz Spill" caused
even more damage for a number of European states. On November 1, 1986,
a fire broke out in a chemical warehouse owned and operated by the Sandoz
Corporation in Schweizerhale, near Basel, Switzerland." The fire spread
rapidly, and approximately 160 firefighters were required to put out the
powerful blaze.22 In part because of all the water used by the fire depart-
ments to combat the fire, between 10,000 and 15,000 cubic meters of
chemically-infested water seeped into the Rhine River through the Sandoz
sewer system.23 A large toxic plume developed in and above the Rhine,
and the chemicals destroyed virtually all of the flora and fauna living in the
river at the time.' Only a minuscule percentage of fish and eels remained
alive, and even most of these had "their eyes popped out, gills collapsed and
Is Schwabach, supra note 3, at 476 n.275.
19 See Gunther Handl, International Responsibility for Manmade Disasters, 81 AM. SoC'Y
INTL'L. L. PRoc. 320, 331 (1987) ("Indeed, some countries like Sweden and Switzerland have
denied publicly the existence of an international legal basis [by which the Soviet Union could
be held liable].").
20 "[D]iplomatic insistence on Soviet liability and compensation might well have
endangered prospects for Soviet concessions at the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) conferences and meetings called to address the multilateral legislative agenda after
Chernobyl." Id.
21 Schwabach, supra note 3, at 450.




skin covered with wounds and sores."'  Scientists estimated that "the
ecological rejuvenation of the river was set back by many years, perhaps
decades.26 In addition, all water supply plants along the Rhine in France,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and West Germany were shut down, and
livestock in France and Germany died as a result of exposure to the river.2
Despite the tremendous danger of the spill, Switzerland failed to notify
any of its neighboring riparian states of the disaster for over twenty-four
hours. It was clear that had some of the states, particularly the Netherlands,
been notified of the spill, they could have initiated measures that would have
drastically reduced the damages.2 Nevertheless, no states brought claims
against Switzerland. 29 Again, several factors might have contributed to the
injured states' decisions to not hold Switzerland responsible. First, all of the
states along the Rhine River had worse environmental records than
Switzerland, so an "unclean hands" idea might have influenced their
decision.30 Second, the Sandoz Company paid a number of claims to
parties that were injured from the spill, providing redress that Switzerland
might have faced had Sandoz not agreed to pay.31 Third, states might not
have wanted to pursue claims against Switzerland because legal action might
have generated stricter, more costly environmental regulations for their own
industries.32
Under a traditional tort analysis, liability would seem to have been a
foregone conclusion for both countries, especially for the Soviet Union.
Because of its negligent maintenance of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant,
the Soviet government caused significant, quantifiable damage to a number
of European states. However, the international legal community had not yet
2 Netter, Anger Along the Rhine Grows After Chemical Spill, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1986,
at A8, col. 3, quoting Walter Hermarnn, Chief Inspector of the Rhine River Police in central
Basel.
' Schwabach, supra note 3, at 447.
27
id
2 With earlier notification the Dutch authorities could have closed a series of floodgates
along the Ijssel River, thereby directing the chemicals to the North Sea. J. Hull, A River Runs
Red, TIME, Nov. 24, 1986, at 36, 37.
2 Schwabach, supra note 3, at 467.
30 d.
31 id.
3 "Polluting industries have reason to be wary of their governments pursuing an
international law remedy against Switzerland. Such efforts might focus unwelcome public
attention on domestic polluters and might be accompanied by a demand for stricter domestic
pollution controls." Id. at 469.
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articulated any specific duties which were incumbent upon states in the event
of an international disaster, and accordingly the Soviet government ducked
under this prong of the liability equation in denying liability for the
radioactive fallout. Thus, when the Soviet Union claimed that it owed no
legal obligations to other affected states as a result of the accident at
Chernobyl,33 it arguably was not incorrect in its interpretation of interna-
tional law as it existed in 1986.3
Additionally, in failing to notify downstream nations of the chemical spill
for over twenty-four hours, Switzerland seemed to be the appropriate entity
from whom to seek recovery, particularly for countries like the Netherlands
who could have avoided significant damage if earlier notification had been
given.3 ' Nevertheless, no clams were brought against Switzerland, due in
part because of 1) the deficiencies which existed in international law
regarding state responsibility, and 2) the deficiencies which existed in treaties
which governed the Rhine, particularly a lack of enforcement mechanisms.36
While international law spoke unauthoritatively in 1986 on the issue of
state responsibility for international disasters, a handful of international cases
and conventions did exist by that time which provided a basic blueprint for
the shaping of customary, or binding, law which eventually evolved in the
area of state responsibility after 1986. First, in the famous Corfu Channel
case decided by the International Court of Justice in 1949, 3 the Court held
that every state has a duty "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states. ' 38  The case focused on
whether Albania was liable for damages when two British ships exploded
after running into mines that were planted in Albanian waters. The Court
devoted most of its opinion to the issue of whether Albania either planted the
mines or knew about the existence of the mines, and the majority of the
Court held that Albania should have known about the existence of the mines.
Thus, Albania was held liable for failing to warn the British ships about the
mines in its territory.39
33 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1986, at 36, col. 1.
' See Stephen McCaffrey, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 809, 811 (1990) (reviewing
CHERNOBYL: LAW AND COMMUNICATION. TRANSBOUNDARY NUCLEAR AIR POLLU-
TION-THE LEGAL MATERIALS (Phillipe Sands, ed. (1988)).
3. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36 Schwabach, supra note 3, at 471.
37 Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom vs. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (1949).
33Id. at 22.
39 id. at 40.
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Many scholars have concluded that the Court espoused a general "duty to
warn" in this case.' Other scholars have pointed out that the Court was
careful not to pronounce an all-encompassing duty, but rather only a duty to
warn when the danger was located within the negligent state's own
territory.41 International law has never recognized the common law
principle of stare decisis so the Corfu Channel case could not be considered,
in and of itself, binding customary international law. 42 Nevertheless, this
decision continues to be cited today as a source for state responsibility, and
it has undoubtedly served as a building block for documents such as the
International Law Commission's Draft Articles and the Rio Declaration,
which both include a general duty to warn.
While the Corfu Channel case involved the issue of whether a state has a
duty to warn another state in the event of impending harm, the Torrey
Canyon case43 dealt more specifically with the issue of whether a state
owes any obligations to another state in the event of a transboundary
disaster. In that case, one of Great Britain's ships leaked considerable
amounts of crude oil onto the shores of Ireland. In an effort to minimize the
leakage, Great Britain bombed its own tanker and sank it. The Court
absolved Great Britain of liability because of its affirmative action, thereby
intimating that Great Britain owed a duty to Ireland to mitigate the
damages."
In another case of transboundary harm, the well-known Trail Smelter
Arbitration,43 the governing tribunal found Canada liable for damages which
a private smelting company in British Columbia had caused to property in
the United States. In granting an injunction against Canada, the tribunal
o See generally Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 141-144 (1992) (discussing a number of scholars' interpretations of the holding
in the Corfu Channel case).
41 Id.
42 See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which lists as
authority for customary international law: 1) bilateral treaties, 2) state practice in the
international community, 3) general principles of law, and 4) the opinion of learned scholars.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, para. I(c), 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs.
77.
43 Barracuda Tanker Corp. and Union Oil Co. of CA v. U.K. and States of Guernsey, 2
Lloyd's Rep. 591 (1969).44 id.
45 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1941) [hereinafter
Trail Smelter].
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stated in dicta, "Under the principles of international law, ... no state has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
[environmental] injury... in or to the territory of another or the properties
of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence." This sentence has
provided the basis for a number of scholars' opinion that after the Trail
Smelter decision, states were under an affirmative duty to prevent any type
of harm occurring within their borders from crossing into the territory of
another country.47
While these cases commanded considerable attention among the interna-
tional legal community prior to 1986, and while they inspired, along with
sources like the Stockholm Convention of 1972, no small degree of academic
banter, Chernobyl and Sandoz revealed the relative inability of these cases
and conventions to shape state practice and customary international law. The
fact remained that prior to the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters of 1986, no
regulatory procedures for notification, cooperation, or dissemination of
information had been uniformly established which could govern the duties
of states in relation to neighboring states in the event of a transnational
disaster.
The Chernobyl explosion and the Sandoz spill brought to the forefront a
number of legal issues which had not been previously addressed in
international law. While the issue of transboundary harm had been discussed
among scholars for decades, it too was lacking a definitive standard within
the international legal community, and Chernobyl and Sandoz exposed the
disharmony among international tribunals and scholarly works regarding
standards of liability for transboundary harm. Thus, while the 1986 disasters
wreaked devastating consequences upon a number of European states, they
also served the purpose of kickstarting a campaign within the international
community to establish more clearly defined procedures and standards which
could govern state responsibility in the event of an international disaster.
PART II: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFr ARTICLES
AND THE Rio DECLARATION ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DISASTERS
Two of the most influential bodies of work which have addressed the issue
of state responsibility for international disasters since the Chernobyl and
46 
id
"" See Birnie and Boyle, supra note 40, at 145.
[Vol. 25:659
CHERNOBYL AND SANDOZ
Sandoz incidents have been 1) the International Law Commission's (ILC)
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, submitted to the General Assembly in 1994, and 2) the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, issued at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. These
two documents embody a decade of work among numerous eminent scholars
in the field of international environmental law, and both documents contain
provisions which specifically respond to the type of international emergency
situations which Chernobyl and Sandoz first brought into the spotlight.
Neither the Draft Articles nor the Rio Declaration can be characterized as
binding, customary law.4' Rather these documents are rather characterized
as "soft law", i.e., recommendations or advisory statements which espouse
what the drafters of the documents believe the law should be.49 Customari-
ly documents such as these serve as "suggestive law" and the principles may,
through time, evolve to the level of binding customary international law if
enough states adopt them in their practice. 0 Nevertheless, certain princi-
ples contained in the Draft Articles and the Rio Declaration represent, in the
opinion of some scholars, a codification of pre-existing, binding customary
international law.51
A. The ILC Draft Articles
The International Law Commission is a United Nations-affiliated body of
experts that periodically issues articles or declarations which both codify
existing principles of international law and promulgate progressive ideas for
the future of international law.52  The ILC's most recent set of Draft
Articles were submitted to the General Assembly in 1994.53 These Articles
' See supra note 42 and accompanying text, discussing the sources of customary
international law.
'4 See generally Wirth, supra note 5, at 602-603.
50 See generally id. 603, 649.
S See, e.g., Reaz Rahman, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses: Dilemma for Lower Riparians, 19 FORDHAM INT'L. LJ. 9, 18 (1995).
52 See David Lazerwitz, The Flow on International Water Law: the International Law
Commission's Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 (1993).
53 For a detailed discussion of the changes that were made in the most recent Draft
Articles compared to the ones that preceded them, see Stephen McCaffrey, The International
Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on International Watercourses, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 395
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deal specifically with the law of international watercourses. They are
divided into six parts which contain a total of thirty-three articles. The
Articles were distributed to the governments of thirty-two countries in 1991
with the expectation that the countries would respond with observations and
comments within a year; by 1994 twenty-one states had submitted some type
of response.-'
Articles 27 and 28 deal specifically with a state's responsibility for
disasters occurring within its borders which might affect neighboring states.
Article 27, entitled "Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions,"
requires states to prevent or mitigate conditions of a disaster which might
affect any other state.5 Article 28, entitled "Emergency situations,"
requires states to notify other states of an emergency originating within its
territory, to prevent, mitigate and eliminate any harmful effects of an
emergency, and to develop contingency plans for responding to emergencies.'
(1995).
m Id. at 397 n.18.
55 Article 27 reads, "Watercourse states shall, individually or jointly, take all appropriate
measures to prevent or mitigate conditions that may be harmful to other watercourse States,
whether resulting from natural causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice conditions,
water-borne diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or desertification." Draft
Articles, supra note 4, Article 27.
Article 28 reads:
1. For the purposes of this article, "emergency" means a situation that
causes, or poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to water-
course States or other States and that results suddenly from natural causes,
such as floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides or earthquakes, or from
human conduct as for example in the case of industrial accidents.
2. A watercourse state shall, without delay and by the most expeditious
means available, notify other potentially affected States and competent
international organizations of any emergency originating within its
territory.
3. A watercourse State within whose territory an emergency originates
shall, in cooperation with potentially affected States, and where appropri-
ate, competent international organizations, immediately take all practica-
ble measures necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and
eliminate harmful effects of the emergency.
4. When necessary, watercourse States shall jointly develop contingency
plans for responding to emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate,
with other potentially affected States and competent international
organizations.
Draft Articles, supra note 4, Article 28.
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B. The Rio Declaration
The Rio Declaration was first issued at the United Nations' Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992. Over 170 nations were represented
at the conference, and over 100 heads of state attended.57 Like its prede-
cessor, the Stockholm Conference of 1972, a number of preparatory meetings
took place prior to the conference in Brazil. At a meeting in March of 1992,
representatives from seven developed and seven developing nations agreed
upon the final text.5" This final text was accepted without alteration at the
conference in Brazil.
Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration respond directly to a number
of the problems that were presented in the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters.
Principle 18 requires states to "immediately notify other States of any natural
disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful
effects on the environment of those States. 59  Principle 19 demands,
"States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information
to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse
transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an
early stage and in good faith."'
In contrast to the ill-defined, if not neo-natal status of international law
regarding state responsibility for international disasters in 1986, the Draft
Articles and the Rio Declaration explicitly articulate a course of conduct for
states in the event of an international disaster. First, both documents
expressly mandate a duty of notification. It is beyond reasonable dispute
that the duty to notify potentially affected states of a transnational disaster
has reached the level of customary international law.61 There is now
"substantial support for such a duty as a matter of general international
law. '62 Notification requirements began to appear in a number of bilateral
and multilateral treaties in 1986, in the wake of Chernobyl and Sandoz.63
Wirth, supra note 5, at 604.
58 Id. at 605-606.
s Rio Declaration, supra note 4, Principle 18.
60 Rio Declaration, supra note 4, Principle 19.
6' See Wirth, supra note 5, at 637.
6 McCaffrey, Book Review, supra note 34, at 811.
' Jeffrey Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration, 4 CoLo. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. &
PoL'y 119, 129 (1993). The most direct responses to the Chernobyl explosion were the
treaties and conventions which were established to govern the responsibilities of states in the
event of nuclear accidents. See International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on
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Thus, the provisions regarding notification requirements in Article 28, section
2 of the Draft Articles and Principles 18 and 19 of the Rio Declaration may
be seen as codifications of pre-existing, customary international law.
Aside from the notification requirement, the Draft Articles articulate
several other duties for states which the Rio Declaration does not include.
First, the Draft Articles prescribe an affirmative duty on the part of a state
within whose territory an emergency originates to "immediately take all
practicable measures necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate,
and eliminate harmful effects of the emergency.'" This duty to prevent
and mitigate the damage of a disaster is not included in the Rio provisions.
It has, however, been incorporated into a number of treaties and conventions
since the catastrophes of 1986.65 Additionally, the Draft Articles articulate
a duty to develop contingency plans with other states and international
organizations in order to respond more effectively to emergencies,' but
again, this duty is not mentioned in the Rio Declaration. Like the duty to
mitigate, a number of treaties and international conventions exist in which
a duty to develop contingency plans has been included.67
PART III: CURRENT STATE RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS APPLIED
TO CHERNOBYL AND SANDOZ: WOULD THEY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
While notions of state responsibility have advanced a great deal over the
course of the last ten years in terms of 1) the duties which have been
delineated for states in the event of a disaster and 2) the unanimity of
opinion among publications and scholars regarding state responsibility,
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 25 I.L.M. 1377
(1986); IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 25 I.L.M. 1370
(1986), supra note 6.
" Draft Articles, supra note 4, Article 28.
65 See Wirth, supra note 5, at 638 n.106 listing the Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 11-12, 31 I.L.M. 1330, the Convention on
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312, art. 15, and seven other international conventions which have included
obligations for states to help prevent and mitigate damages in the event of an international
disaster.
"Draft Articles, supra note 4, Principle 28.
67 For a comprehensive list of conventions and treaties which incorporate a duty to




several important issues remain as ill-defined and uncertain as they were a
decade ago. By applying the customary international law principles of 1996
to the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters of 1986, both the progress and the
stagnation of international law in the area of transboundary disaster standards
can be illuminated.
First, applying current customary international law to the Soviet Union's
response to the explosion in 1986, it is clear that the Soviet government
would have violated its duty to notify potentially affected states about the
nuclear accident. As dictated by the Rio Declaration, the Soviet Union
should have informed all potentially affected states of the accident as soon
as the reactor exploded and the radioactive material was launched into the
atmosphere. Additionally, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident requires that all states must "notify, directly or through the
International Atomic Energy Agency... those States which are or may be
physically affected. '68 As the Soviet government waited fifteen days before
it ever released any information to the international community, it would
almost certainly be liable under today's notification standards.
While a duty to notify in the event of a nuclear accident has almost
certainly attained the status of customary international law, other duties
which have been articulated in various treaties and conventions have not,
even one decade after Chernobyl. For example, even today no treaty or
convention exists which requires "source states" to assist other states in the
event of a nuclear accident. Although the Soviet Union signed the
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency in September of 1986, the articles in this Convention never
actually obligate a state to render assistance.69 They merely allow Member
States to request assistance in the event of a nuclear accident. Additionally,
while certain international instruments such as the ILC Draft Articles require
offending states to assist injured states in mitigating the damages and in
developing contingency plans, duties such as these have not been specifically
articulated in relation to nuclear accidents and radioactive fallout.7" And
even while the duty to notify has become a firmly entrenched obligation for
6Notification Convention, supra note 6, Article 2.
69 Reinhard Muller and Birgit Sub, Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS AND
DuTiEs OF DIscLosuRE 1, 24 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1994).
70 Leigh Hancher and Peter Cameron, After Chernobyl: Has Anything Really Changed?,
in NucLEAR ENERGY LAW AFrER CHERNOBYL 179, 186 (Cameron, Hancher, and Kuhn eds.,
1988.)
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states in the event of a nuclear accident, problems remain as to the scope of
the notification and the specific reporting requirements which must be
followed. 71 "Conventions are limited in a number of important respects.
The definition of 'accident' is not precise, reporting obligations are ill-
defined, and there is no generally recognized standard governing the
information which is to be transmitted. ' 72
Thus, while the past decade has witnessed a concerted effort among
scholars and international bodies to address the deficiencies in international
law which Chernobyl initially revealed, the fact remains that only the duty
to notify seems to have attained the status of binding customary law in
relation to nuclear accidents. In other words, even if the international law
standards of 1996 were applied to the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the Soviet
Union would still probably be able to successfully maintain that it owed no
legal obligations to any other state, aside from its duty to notify.
If the Sandoz scenario were to repeat itself today, the duties incumbent
upon Switzerland in the wake of the spill would be much more clearly
defined. Recalling the facts of the Sandoz accident, the Swiss government
failed to notify its neighboring Rhine states of the deadly spill for over
twenty-four hours, and this failure to notify precluded European governments
from pursuing preventive measures which could have potentially reduced the
scope of the damages. Ten years later, according to the ILC Draft Articles,
Switzerland would be under an immediate duty to "notify other potentially
affected States and competent international organizations of any emergency
originating within its territory.'' 3 Additionally, it would be obligated to
"immediately take all practicable measures necessitated by the circumstances
to prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects of the emergency., 74
In addition to the ILC Draft Articles, Switzerland has entered into several
other conventions and treaties which have been established since the Sandoz
accident, and these instrumentalities would also play a part in determining
what duties Switzerland would owe its neighboring states. For example, the
Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, signed by
twenty-four European states, Canada and the United States in 1992, includes
a lengthy list of obligations for states in the event of an industrial acci-
71 Id
72id
' Article 28, Draft Articles, supra note 4.
74 Id art. 27.
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dent."5 Among these obligations are principles of prevention,76 informa-
tion exchange," notification," and assistance.79
A. Standard of Liability
In the wake of both the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters, one of the most
pressing concerns among the European Community was how, and under
what standard of liability, damages could be recovered against the Soviet
Union and Switzerland. No claims were brought against the two countries
because, at least in part, injured states did not believe they could recover any
damages against the offending states.8s And ten years later, while interna-
tional law concerning environmental disasters has progressed rapidly in areas
such as notification, cooperation, and mitigation of damages, it has remained
stubbornly static in the area of liability for transboundary harm."' Indeed,
in revisiting the two disasters of 1986 and comparing the legal regimes
which existed at the time with the current established standards which exist
one decade later, the most glaring deficiency that remains today is the lack
of firmly incorporated liability standards for transboundary harm.
In 1972, Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration set forth a standard
which has been followed over the course of the last two decades with
frustrating repetition in innumerable conventions and treaties.82 It provides:
States shall co-operate to develop further the international
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
71 Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, supra note 65.
76 Id. art. 3, para. 3.
" Id. art. 9, para. 3.
7 Id. art. 10, para. 2.
Id. art. 12, para. 1.
o See supra note 19 and accompanying text; Helmut Heiss, Legal Protection Against
Transboundary Radiation Pollution: A Treaty Proposal, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 167,
168 (1993).
8' "The solution that customary public international law provides for the problems arising
in transboundary radiation suits is illusory." Id, at 178.
8 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
20, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/art. 235, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1315; Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
Mar. 24, 1983, art. 14, 22 I.L.M. 221, 231 (1983); Convention for Cooperation in the
Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central
African Region, Mar. 16 1981, art. 15, 20 I.L.M. 746, 751 (1981).
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pollution and other environmental damage caused by
activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to
areas beyond their jurisdiction. 3
Even the recent Rio Declaration and the ILC Draft Articles avoid prescribing
any specific standard of liability for transboundary harm. Principle 13 of the
Rio Declaration copies, almost verbatim, the supplication enunciated in
Stockholm 20 years earlier to "develop further international law regarding
liability and compensation .... " While the ILC Draft Articles mark a
slight improvement over Stockholm and Rio in that they articulate a standard
of care for activities which could affect other watercourse states, they
nevertheless abstain from delineating any specific standard of liability for
transboundary harm. Article 7 reads, "Watercourse states shall exercise due
diligence to utilize an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause
significant harm to other watercourse States."8' 5 It continues that if a state
exercises due diligence but nevertheless causes significant harm to another
state, the offending state shall consult with the harmed state regarding "(a)
the extent to which such use is equitable ... ; [and] (b) the question of ad
hoc adjustments to its utilization, designed to eliminate or mitigate any such
harm caused, and where appropriate, the question of compensation."'
Other important conventions and treaties have also elected to circumvent
the issue of liability for transboundary harm. The Convention on Transboun-
dary Effects of Industrial Accidents sidesteps the issue when it states in
Article 13, "The Parties shall support appropriate international efforts to
elaborate rules, criteria and procedures in the field of responsibility and
liability." Similarly, neither of the two Conventions which were created in
the wake of the Chernobyl explosion, the Convention on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident, contain any provisions which specifically address the
issues of compensation or standards of liability. While the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recognized the lack of global nuclear
3 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and
Corr.1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
" "States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop
further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of
environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond
their jurisdiction." Rio Declaration, supra note 4, Principle 13.




liability standards and has established a Standing Committee on Liability for
Nuclear Damage, 7 the Committee has thus far made little practical progress
in establishing nuclear liability standards.
Even with the application of a conventional tort cause of action, establish-
ing the liability of a source state in the case of a nuclear accident remains
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible."8 The question of whom to
sue, 9 the immunity defense of the operator and the state," the hurdle of
service of process,91 the inability of plaintiffs to obtain incriminating
information,' the insufficiency of public international law to address the
needs of private radiation victims,93 and the difficulties in proving causa-
tion all contribute to make damages virtually irrecoverable against a
source state in the event of a nuclear accident.
Several of these factors have played a large role in shaping the policy of
the Irish government in relation to a long-standing dispute between Ireland
and Great Britain over the Sellafield nuclear power installation off of the
coast of Scotland. Even while daily emissions of radioactive effluent spill
out of the nuclear installation at Sellafield and into the Irish Sea, the Irish
government continues to abstain from initiating legal proceedings against
Great Britain.95 Nearly 1000 accidents have purportedly taken place at the
Sellafield facility in recent years,96 and the British installation dumps such
prolific amounts of toxic discharge into the Irish Sea that various authorities
8 Heiss, supra note 80, at 170.
Id.
The difficulty in ascertaining who the appropriate defendant was in the Chernobyl
accident discouraged potential plaintiffs from bringing a claim. Was it the chief operator of
the plant? The Soviet Nuclear Energy Commission? The Soviet Union itself? Id. at 171.
" When the state is considered the "operator" it could easily invoke absolute immunity,
claiming the disaster was caused by an act which would normally be entitled to absolute
immunity protection. Id at 173.
9 hid at 175.
92 Without an obligation to exchange information, discovery on the part of a potential
plaintiff might be rendered impossible. The Soviet Union refused to provide the international
community with large amounts of information about the accident until several years after the
explosion took place. Id. at 176.
9Id at 179.
After Chernobyl, the Soviet Union claimed that a substantial amount of the harm that
was being claimed originated from unwarranted regulatory prohibitions on the part European
governments rather than from the Chernobyl accident itself. Id. at 180.
9 Hall, supra note 7, at 658.
' Id at 647.
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call the Irish Sea "the most radioactive sea on the planet." 97 Nevertheless,
the Irish Attorney-General recently rejected a call to sue the British
government for damages sustained in Ireland as a result of the radioactive
leaks because of the scientific difficulty in linking the injuries which have
been suffered by the Irish with the Sellafield radioactive effluent.98 As one
deputy observed, any evidence needed to sustain a claim remained "in the
documentation of Sellafield." 99
B. Strict Liability vs. Negligence
Since most of the conventions and treaties which address international
disasters and transboundary harm have failed to provide any uniform
standards of liability or any compensation schemes, should it be assumed
that damages may never be recovered even if binding international duties are
violated? While sources of international law remain vague as to the
appropriate standards that should be applied in the event of a violation,
damages have certainly been recovered in the past in cases of transboundary
harm. In other words, the scant attention given to the issues of liability and
compensation in international conventions and treaties does not preclude an
injured state from recovering an award for damages. It rather suggests that
publicists and governments are hesitant to commit to any uniform standards
for recovery, and it requires courts and governing bodies to determine for
themselves what standards of liability should be appropriate in each
individual case.
One question that inevitably arises when the issue of liability is presented
is the issue of whether a strict liability or a negligence standard should be
applied. Many scholars point to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
as evidence of strict liability for any type of transboundary harm. 1 °
Principle 21 reads: "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law ... the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
97 Id. at 648.
98 In a separate request to bring an action against Great Britain for the leakage of the
radioactive effluent from the British facility, the decision was made to forgo legal proceedings
because of a "lack of sufficient evidence." Ii. at 674.
9'9 M. at 675.
'0o See Catherine Tinker, Strict Liability of States for Environmental Harm: An Emerging
Principle of International Law, 3 TouRo J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 156 (1992).
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damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. 1 1  While "damage" is not qualified by words like
"substantial"" or "significant," 10 3 and while "activities" is not limited
to activities within the state's control, the Principle nevertheless refrains from
mentioning strict liability.
Some scholars believe that the spirit of the Principle endorses a strict
liability standard,' °4 while others believe that the absence of the term
"strict liability" indicates that the drafters of the declaration did not intend
for strict liability to apply."° Regardless of what the drafters intended,
states in the international community have not usually recognized strict
liability as the appropriate standard for state responsibility for transboundary
harm. Only a small number of treaties have recognized strict liability
as the appropriate standard of liability."° In addition, developing countries
unequivocally disfavor a strict liability standard because they lack the
technical ability to monitor and assess transboundary harm." They argue
that a strict liability standard inequitably inhibits their ability to grow, as it
would increase costs of industrial operations. 9
A negligence standard for transboundary harm seems to be the more
recognized standard in international law.' Several scholars advocate a
traditional tort analysis to international transboundary harm, where a
101 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 83, Principle 21.
102 "Substantial harm" is used in the 1966 Helsinki Rules; see Report of the Fifty-Second
Conference, the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, International
Law Association (Helsinki 1966).
103 "Significant harm" is used in the Restatement of International Law. See RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sect. 601(1)(b)
(1987).
"o See, e.g., Karl Zemanek, State Responsibility and Liability in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (W. Lang, ed. 1991); Schneider, WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 6 (1975).
'05 See Developments, supra note 1, at 1499.
16 See Birnie and Boyle, supra note 40, at 147.
107 See, e.g., Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25,
1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 268 (1963); Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762.
108 "Strict liability is anathema to developing countries.. . which do have the technical
resources." Developments, supra note 1, at 1499.
109 See Zemanek, supra note 104, at 189.
10 "International law has traditionally conditioned the imposition of state responsibility
on a showing of negligence." Developments, supra note 1, at 1499.
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complaining state must prove 1) that the offending conduct is attributable to
the defendant state, 2) that the offending state breached an international duty,
3) that a causal connection exists between the conduct and the injury, and 4)
that material damages took place."' Under this type of standard, the
crucial inquiries are 1) whether the offending state owed a duty to the
injured state, and 2) whether the offending state caused the harm.
The previously-mentioned Trail Smelter arbitration has been used by
scholars in both camps of the strict liability/negligence debate. Those that
endorse the strict liability standard112 focus on the part of the tribunal's
decision which says, "Under the principles of international law,. . . no state
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury ... in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons
therein ... ,',1 These scholars hold fast to the Roman Law principle of
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which means "One should use his own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."." 4 However,
other scholars who believe that Trail Smelter stands for a negligence
standard of liability point out that both parties (the United States and
Canada) had already agreed to a compromise which stipulated Canada's
wrongdoing in the case, so fault was, in fact, a critical element of the
decision.
1 5
PART IV: REALITY CHECK: THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY
OVER INTERNATIONAL LAW
While international law on state responsibility has developed dramatically
over the course of the last ten years, it nevertheless remains-to a large
extent-an unenforceable, aspirational body of law." 6 In other words,
while widespread state practice might push certain concepts toward becoming
"binding" international law principles, states will continue to act in their own
.. See, e.g., Tamara C. Gereghian, Medzamor: Weighing the Reopening of Armenia's
Unstable Nuclear Power Plant and the Duties of the International Community, 5 VILLA.
ENVT'L. L.J. 163, 170 (1994); L.E. Goldie, International Responsibility for Manmade
Disasters, SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PRoc. 320, 339 (1987).
12 See, e.g., J. Brownlie, A Survey of Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13
NAT. RESOURCES J. 179, 187 (1973).
"3 Trail Smelter, supra note 45.
14 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 6TH EDMON 1380 (1990).
'5 See generally, Birnie and Boyle, supra note 40, at 145.
116 See Developments, supra note 1, at 1507.
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best interests, regardless of the status of international law. This is especially
true when matters of state sovereignty are concerned." '117 For example, in
the dispute between Ireland and Great Britain over the Sellafield nuclear
installation, Britain has informed Ireland that it will not grant jurisdiction to
the International Court of Justice to settle the matter.1 18 Thus, even while
scores of international conventions and treaties now mandate a variety of
obligations for states in the wake of transboundary harm, these duties
inevitably remain subject to the governments, and more specifically the
leaders, of the countries who choose to follow or reject them.1 9
Because customary international law is shaped, first and foremost, by the
conduct of states in international affairs, the conduct of the Soviet and Swiss
governments in the aftermath of the Chernobyl and Sandoz disasters
ironically may have thwarted the effectiveness of subsequent conventions and
treaties. The fact that the two countries failed to promptly notify other
affected countries of the accidents, coupled with the fact that no legal
obligations arose for Switzerland or the Soviet Union in spite of their
conduct influences, to a large degree, "state practice" and subsequently
customary international law."2 Herein lies the bane of customary interna-
tional law: states do not always do what is right; they only do what is in
their best interest. So as long as state practice remains the primary influence
in shaping customary international law, as opposed to the other way around,
progress in international law will continue to trickle along at a slow and
frustrating pace.
In light of international law's questionable capacity to shape the conduct
of states, scholars have recently begun to focus more on the utility of
negotiation and diplomacy and less on the merits of international law in
"' "The problem is that even though the idea of an international. . . regime that would
provide clear-cut standards for conduct and would have the authority to sanction those who
violated the standards sounds appealing in theory, attempts to do so will always run into the
stumbling block of state sovereignty." Moynagh, supra note 2, at 747.
118 Hall, supra note 7, at 678. Hall concludes, "International environmental law remains
subject to the self-interested imperatives of the Sovereign State." Id. at 679.
"' "Ongoing attempts to make regulation of transboundary environmental harm conform
to the abstract principles of international law only highlight the inapplicability of classic
international legal paradigms to extraterritorial pollution." Developments, supra note 1, at
1520.
"2 In neglecting to hold Switzerland responsible for its failure to protect the Rhine, the
other Rhine states created "a normative expectation that riparian states will not be held legally
culpable for ecological damage." Schwabach, supra note 3, at 479.
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establishing workable norms for state responsibility. 2 1  Chernobyl and
Sandoz highlight the critical role that politics play in determining a state's
conduct in the wake of an international disaster. Because of strong
diplomatic coercion from states which were harmed by the Sandoz spill,
Switzerland agreed to take responsibility for the accident, and it made
substantial concessions in subsequent negotiations. The Soviet Union, on the
other hand, conceded nothing to the international community, in large part
because of a failure on the part of the international community to exert
meaningful political pressure. Diplomatic measures, rather than abstract
legal principles, carry with them a much more real and effective capacity to
influence the conduct of states.' 22 Scholars should therefore focus more
on the shared common interests between states and the interdependent
political incentives which foster meaningful international cooperation, rather
than on the theoretical legal duties which the scholars themselves have
created and which rarely effect the conduct of sovereign states.
121 See generally Heiss, supra note 80.
'2 Raymond Cohen, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES 22-25 (1991).
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